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Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games

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  • , A.

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is said to be achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the underlying coalitional game. In some but not all games with discounting, the necessary conditions for achievability are also sufficient for a profile to be the limit of achievable profiles as the period length shrinks to zero. Consequently, in these games when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable profiles does not depend on the move structure; (ii) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can be achieved almost instantly.

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  • , A., 2013. "Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1175
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    3. Marco Battaglini & Salvatore Nunnari & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2016. "The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 268-308, November.
    4. Matros, Alexander & Ponomareva, Natalia & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2019. "Search without observability," Working Papers 2019-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    5. Gregorio Curello, 2021. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," Papers 2109.01885, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    6. de Roos, Nicolas & Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Shipwrecks and treasure hunters," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 259-283.
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    8. Erik Madsen & Eran Shmaya, 2024. "Collective Upkeep," Papers 2407.05196, arXiv.org.
    9. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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    11. Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2019. "Donation-based crowdfunding with refund bonuses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 452-471.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic games; monotone games; core; public goods; voluntary contribution; gradualism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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