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When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?

Author

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  • R. J. Aumann
  • J. H. Dreze

Abstract

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value–what rational players may expect–and optimal strategies–how they should play to achieve that expectation. Seventyseven years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic questions of value and optimal strategies are concerned. Equilibrium theories do not tell players how to play and what to expect; even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it it is not at all clear that the players “should” play this equilibrium, nor that they should expect its payoff. Here, we return to square one: abandon all ideas of equilibrium and simply ask, how should rational players play, and what should they expect. We provide answers to both questions, for all n-person games in strategic form.

Suggested Citation

  • R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?," Discussion Paper Series dp387, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp387
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    Cited by:

    1. Rode, Julian, 2010. "Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 325-338, January.
    2. Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute.
    3. Noa Nitzan, 2005. "Tight Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp394, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Bo Rothstein & Daniel Eek, 2009. "Political Corruption and Social Trust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(1), pages 81-112, February.
    5. Rode, Julian, 2008. "Truth and trust in communication : experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Papers 08-04, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    6. Koch, Lars P., 2008. "Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 14/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    7. Bo Rothstein, 2011. "Can markets be expected to prevent themselves from self‐destruction?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 387-404, December.

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