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Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?

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  • Mariotti, Marco

Abstract

In Bayesian game theory, each player obeys the Savage axioms and there is common knowledge of this. The author shows that two of the less controversial axioms (ordering and dominance) are incompatible with some elementary game theoretic principles. He furthermore argues that his impossibility result is the consequence of a more fundamental conflict between the states of nature/acts framework of decision theory and the principles of strategic rationality. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariotti, Marco, 1995. "Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1099-1109, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:432:p:1099-1109
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    Cited by:

    1. Teng, Jimmy, 2010. "Bayesian Theory of Games: A Statistical Decision Theoretic Based Analysis of Strategic Interactions," MPRA Paper 24189, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?," Discussion Paper Series dp387, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2009. "Assessing Strategic Risk," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 1-16, February.
    4. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games," Post-Print halshs-01589566, HAL.
    5. Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Solving Two Sided Incomplete Information Games with Bayesian Iterative Conjectures Approach," MPRA Paper 40061, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jul 2012.
    6. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    7. repec:spr:joecth:v:63:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0972-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Defalvard, Hervé, 2000. "Croyances individuelles et coordination sociale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(3), pages 341-364, septembre.
    9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Mixed extensions of decision problems under uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 827-866, April.
    10. Favereau, Olivier, 2011. "New Institutional Economics versus Economics of Conventions: The difference between bounded rationality and... bounded rationality," economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 13(1), pages 22-27.
    11. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    12. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players," Working Papers halshs-01633126, HAL.

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