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Learning to be Sociable: The Evolution of Homo Economicus

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  • Irene C. L. Ng
  • Lu‐Ming Tseng

Abstract

. This article studies the evolution of the economic man (Homo economicus) from its original conception until the current day. By analyzing the discourse of economic articles, we provide a chronological account of the economic man's intellectual and philosophical development as it evolved from what we term the philosophical age to the neoclassical age and finally to the strategic age. The article then shows how the economic man in the strategic age is slowly finding convergence with the sociological man (Homo sociologicus). A reconciliation of the two sapiens is difficult. However, recent papers on behavioral and experimental economics provide insights into a possible reconciliation. Our study argues that the purpose of the sociological man is to identify who he is, how he interacts with people within a society, and the antecedents to such behaviors. Homo economicus, however, has no overarching philosophical assumptions on what he values. The objectives of each discipline are different and, once one is mapped onto the other, it is unclear if there is truly any tension between them.

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  • Irene C. L. Ng & Lu‐Ming Tseng, 2008. "Learning to be Sociable: The Evolution of Homo Economicus," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 265-286, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:67:y:2008:i:2:p:265-286
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2008.00570.x
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    4. Zawojska, Aldona, 2010. "Homo agricola considered as homo economicus and homo politicus," IAMO Forum 2010: Institutions in Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance 52709, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
    5. Li, Yi-Na & Li, Yan & Chen, Haipeng (Allan) & Wei, Jiuchang, 2023. "How verbal and non-verbal cues in a CEO apology for a corporate crisis affect a firm’s social disapproval," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    6. Anna Justyna Parzonko & Agata Balińska & Anna Sieczko, 2021. "Pro-Environmental Behaviors of Generation Z in the Context of the Concept of Homo Socio-Oeconomicus," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-18, March.

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