IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/teavfo/2001-28.html

Testing Threats in Repeated Games

Author

Listed:
  • Spiegler, R.

Abstract

I introduce a solution concept for infinite-horizon games, called ``Experimental Equilibrium``, in which players systematically test threats that affect their optimal response. Both the tests and the optimal response are part of equilibrium behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiegler, R., 2001. "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Papers 2001-28, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-28
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ran Spiegler, 2025. "Machine-Learning to Trust," Papers 2507.10363, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    3. Ran Spiegler, 2006. "The Market for Quacks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131.
    4. Mathevet, Laurent, 2018. "An axiomatization of plays in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 19-31.
    5. Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
    6. Irene C. L. Ng & Lu‐Ming Tseng, 2008. "Learning to be Sociable: The Evolution of Homo Economicus," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 265-286, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.