## Research classified by
*Journal of
Economic Literature* (JEL) codes

Top JEL

/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

/ / /

**C79: Other**

**This topic is covered by the following reading lists:**

Most recent items first, undated at the end.

**Maximum Entropy Estimation of Statistical Equilibrium in Economic Quantal Response Models**

*by*Ellis Scharfenaker & Duncan Foley

**In this paper, I examine a situation where economic agents facing a trade-off between exploring a new option and exploiting their existing knowledge about a safe option, are heterogeneous with respect to their innate abilities in exploring the new option. I consider a two-armed bandit framework in continuous time with one safe arm and one risky arm. There are two players and each has access to an identical safe arm and a risky arm. A player using the safe arm experiences a safe flow payoff whereas the payoff from a bad risky arm is worse than the safe arm and that of the good risky arm is better than the safe arm. Players start with a common prior about the probability of the risky arm being good. I show that if the degree of heterogeneity between the players is high enough, then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in simple cutoff strategies. For any degree of heterogeneity, there always exist equilibria where at least one player uses a non-cutoff strategy. When the equilibrium in cutoff strategies exists, it strictly dominates any other equilibria. When there does not exist any equilibrium in cutoff strategies, for some range of heterogeneity we can identify the welfare maximising equilibrium. For very low range of heterogeneity, the ranking among the equilibria is ambiguous**

*by*Kaustav Das

**No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources**

*by*António Osório

**Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability**

*by*Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru

**Equilibrium trust**

*by*Anderlini, Luca & Terlizzese, Daniele

**Proportionality, Equality, and Duality in Bankruptcy Problems with Nontransferable Utility**

*by*Dietzenbacher, Bas & Estévez-Fernández, A. & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud

**Costly Pretrial Agreements**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino

**Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Legal Efficiency and Consistency**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

**On the Economics of Crisis Contracts**

*by*Elias, Aptus & Gersbach, Hans & Volker, Britz

**Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective**

*by*João Ricardo Faria & Rajeev K. Goel

**The importance of being honest**

*by*Klein, Nicolas

**Non-bossiness**

*by*William Thomson

**Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes**

*by*Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi

**Beneficial and Harmful Addictions: Two sides of the same coin**

*by*Rafael López

**Bounded memory Folk Theorem**

*by*Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid

**A new characterization of the proportional rule for claims problems**

*by*Thomson, William

**Medición y manipulación de normas sociales en juegos experimentales de corrupción**

*by*Anabel Belaus & Cecilia Reyna & Esteban Freidin

**Choice Complexity and Market Competition**

*by*Ran Spiegler

**Expropriation and the Location of Farmland Investment: a theoretical investigation into the Land Rush**

*by*Rosete, Alfredo

**Endogenous divorce and human capital production**

*by*Amanda Gosling & Maria D. C. Garcia-Alonso

**Game Theory of Green and Non-green Oriented Productions: Dried Longan Enterprises**

*by*CHANITA PANMANEE & ROENGCHAI TANSUCHAT & AREE CHEAMUANGPHAN & KASEM KUNASRI & NISACHON LEERATTANAKORN

**A hierarchical network formation model**

*by*Atabati, Omid & Farzad, Babak

**Elementary game theory**

*by*Soni, Himanshu & Sharma, Damini

**A Mechanism for Optimal Enforcement of Coordination: Sidestepping Theory of Mind**

*by*Alexander Funcke & Daniel Cownden

**N-Poly Viability and Conglopolistic Competition in Small Emerging Market**

*by*Raul V. Fabella

**Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting Games: An Experiment**

*by*Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe

**Designing Fair Tiebreak Mechanisms: The Case of FIFA Penalty Shootouts**

*by*Nejat Anbarci & Ching-Jen Sun & M. Utku Unver

**Money as Minimal Complexity**

*by*Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi & Martin Shubik

**Learning to open up: Capital account liberalizations in the post-Bretton Woods era**

*by*Bicaba, Zorobabel T. & Coricelli, Fabrizio

**Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency**

*by*Madarász, Kristóf

**Un análisis del mecanismo de subastas de cargo por confiabilidad en el mercado eléctrico colombiano**

*by*Alejandra Catalina Parra Ochoa

**Designing Fair Tiebreak Mechanisms: The Case of FIFA Penalty Shootouts**

*by*Nejat Anbarci & Ching-Jen Sun & M. Utku Ünver

**No-Envy and Egalitarian-Equivalence under Multi-Object-Demand for Heterogeneous Objects**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Theory of Combinatorial Games**

*by*Fraenkel, Aviezri S. & Hearn, Robert A. & Siegel, Aaron N.

**Theory of Combinatorial Games**

*by*Fraenkel, Aviezri S. & Hearn, Robert A. & Siegel, Aaron N.

**Union Duopoly with Heterogeneous Labour: The Effect of Wage Ceilings**

*by*Ana Paula Martins

**How did distributional preferences change during the Great Recession?**

*by*Fisman, Raymond & Jakiela, Pamela & Kariv, Shachar

**Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty**

*by*Oury, Marion

**Agility in repeated games: An example**

*by*Spiegler, Ran

**Beneficial and Harmful Addictions: Two sides of the same coin**

*by*López, Rafael

**The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice**

*by*Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kesten, Onur

**On the economics of crisis contracts**

*by*Aptus, Elias & Britz, Volker & Gersbach, Hans

**A strategic model for network formation**

*by*Atabati, Omid & Farzad, Babak

**A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources**

*by*Osorio, Antonio

**Choice of financing mode as a stochastic bounded control problem**

*by*Miglo, Anton

**How Did Distributional Preferences Change During the Great Recession?**

*by*Raymond Fisman & Pamela Jakiela & Shachar Kariv

**Uniformity and games decomposition**

*by*Joseph Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos & Marco Scarsini

**Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Minimally Complex Exchange Mechanisms: Emergence of Prices, Markets, and Money**

*by*Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi & Martin Shubik

**Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules**

*by*Vilen Lipatov

**Preferred Suppliers in Asymmetric Auction Markets**

*by*Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry

**Why Stare Decisis?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

**Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism**

*by*Zak, F.

**Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice: Temptation, Perfectionism, Self-deception**

*by*Zak, F.

**Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision**

*by*Charness, Gary & Yang, Chun-Lei

**Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems**

*by*Adachi, Tsuyoshi

**River Sharing and Water Trade**

*by*Weikard, Hans-Peter & Ansink, Erik & Gengenbach, Michael

**Noisy retrievers and the four-fold reaction to rare events**

*by*Davide Marchiori & Sibilla Di Guida & Ido Erev

**On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games**

*by*Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann

**Biased Bayesian Learning with an Application to the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle**

*by*Alexander Ludwig and Alexander Zimper

**Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update**

*by*William Thomson

**Biased Bayesian learning with an application to the risk-free rate puzzle**

*by*Alexander Ludwig & Alexander Zimper

**An aggregation function to solve multicriteria ranking problem involving several decision makers**

*by*Savadogo, Zoïnabo & Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoit M. & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. & Somé, Blaise

**Determinants of relative bargaining power in monetary unions**

*by*Brigitte Granville & Dominik Nagly

**The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement - Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations**

*by*Thijs Dekker & Rob Dellink & Janina Ketterer

**Giving according to preferences: Decision-making in the group dictator game**

*by*Axel Franzen & Sonja Pointner

**Nash Equilibrium And Dynamics**

*by*Sergiu Hart

**Adaptive Heuristics**

*by*Sergiu Hart

**How Long To Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity Of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures**

*by*Sergiu Hart & Yishay Mansour

**Uncoupled Automata And Pure Nash Equilibria**

*by*Yakov Babichenko

**General Procedures Leading To Correlated Equilibria**

*by*Amotz Cahn

**Existence Of Correlated Equilibria**

*by*Sergiu Hart & David Schmeidler

**Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics**

*by*Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell

**Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains**

*by*Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik

**Faculty Promotion in Academe: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Economics Departments**

*by*João Ricardo Faria & Paulo R.A. Loureiro & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Adolfo Sachsida

**Surplus extraction with rich type spaces**

*by*Farinha Luz, Vitor

**A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims**

*by*Thomson, William

**The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network**

*by*Moulin, Hervé & Velez, Rodrigo A.

**The role of information in contests**

*by*Dubey, Pradeep

**Motivational cherry picking**

*by*Regner, Tobias & Riener, Gerhard

**Networks and Collective Action**

*by*Ramon Flores & Maurice Koster & Ines Lindner & Elisenda Molina

**On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction**

*by*René van den Brink & Frank Steffen

**On the axiomatics of resource allocation: Interpreting the consistency principle**

*by*William Thomson

**Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**Indirect Taxation and Privatization in a Model of Government's Preference**

*by*Choi, Kangsik

**Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities**

*by*Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob & Potipiti, Tanapong

**How can Language be linked to Economics? A Survey of Two Strands of Research**

*by*Weiguo Zhang & Gilles Grenier

**On the Role of Information in Contests**

*by*Pradeep Dubey

**The Allocation of a Prize (Expanded)**

*by*Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sah

**Delegation Principle for Multi-agency Games under Ex Post Equilibrium**

*by*Yu Chen & Zhenhua Wu

**Legislative Effort and Career Paths in the Argentine Congress**

*by*Martín A. Rossi & Mariano Tommasi

**Legislative Effort and Career Paths in the Argentine Congress**

*by*Martín Rossi & Mariano Tommasi

**The Allocation of a Prize (R)**

*by*Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi

**Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**A Market for Connections**

*by*Topi Miettinen & Panu Poutvaara

**Aggregate Uncertainty Can Lead to Herds**

*by*Ignacio Monzón

**Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games**

*by*Lina Mallozzi & Stef Tijs

**Endogenous household interaction**

*by*Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher

**Consumer bounded rationality and rigidity/flexibility retail price patterns**

*by*Spiegler, Ran

**Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing**

*by*Dahiya, Sandeep & Ray, Korok

**Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice**

*by*Georgescu Alexandru

**Nash Equilibria of Network Formation Games under Consent**

*by*Robert P. Gilles & Subhadip Chakrabarti & Sudipta Sarangi

**Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**The Problem of Points**

*by*Cantillo, Andres

**Mixed extensions of decision-form games**

*by*Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela

**Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable**

*by*Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can

**Divergent Platforms**

*by*Sophie Bade

**Motivational Cherry Picking**

*by*Tobias Regner & Gerhard Riener

**Kapita³ spo³eczny a poziom rozwoju gospodarczego w œwietle modelu jastrz¹b-go³¹b**

*by*Dorota Wêziak-Bia³owolska & Piotr Bia³owolski

**Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains**

*by*Debasis Mishra & Souvik Roy

**The Unnoticed Difference between Antitrust and Competition Policy**

*by*Petra Luňáčková

**Pricing under the Threat of Piracy: Flexibility and Platforms for Digital Goods**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Thomas Eisenbach & Joan Feigenbaum & Scott Shenker

**Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Why Stare Decisis?**

*by*Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro

**Frontier-based performance analysis models for supply chain management; state of the art and research directions**

*by*AGRELL, Per & HATAMI-MARBINI, Adel

**Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**On the strategic use of attention grabbers**

*by*Spiegler, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir

**La oferta laboral de los hogares en México. Modelos de interacción estratégica**

*by*Huffman Espinosa, Curtis & Gameren, Edwin van

**Robust monopoly pricing**

*by*Bergemann, Dirk & Schlag, Karl

**Price-taking behavior versus continuous dynamic optimizing**

*by*Huang, Weihong

**Unions, government's preference, and privatization**

*by*Choi, Kangsik

**How does bargaining power affect remittances?**

*by*Aísa, R. & Andaluz, J. & Larramona, G.

**On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games**

*by*Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

**Network formation with heterogeneous agents and absolute friction**

*by*J. VANDENBOSSCHE & T. DEMUYNCK & -

**Communication Network Formation with Link Specificity and Value Transferability**

*by*Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J.W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G.C.

**The Structure of Online Consumer Communication Networks**

*by*Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J.W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G.C.

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**A model for coopetitive games**

*by*Carfì, David

**We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory**

*by*Smerilli, Alessandra

**Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining**

*by*Karagozoglu, Emin & Riedl, Arno

**Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining**

*by*Karagozoglu, Emin & Riedl, Arno

**Hölder Continuous Implementation**

*by*Oury Marion

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi

**Rationalizable Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux

**Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining**

*by*Emin Karagözoglu & Arno Riedl

**Egalitarian-equivalent Groves Mechanisms in the Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Welfare Bounds in a Growing Population**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff

**The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers**

*by*Elvio Accinelli Gamba & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

**Dynamic Complementarities, Efficiency and Nash Equilibria for Populations of Firms and Workers**

*by*Elvio Accinelli & Silvia London & Lionello F. Punzo & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

**Innovación En Situaciones De Negociación. Herramientas Inventivas Para Crear Valor**

*by*DAVID GLEISER

**Endogeneous Household Interaction**

*by*Daniela Del Boca & Christopher Flinn

**A Model of Imitative Behavior in the Population of Firms and Workers**

*by*Elvio Accinelli & Silvia London & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

**Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information**

*by*Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbaï, Erwann

**Understanding Terrorist Network Topologies and Their Resilience Against Disruption**

*by*Lindelauf, R. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M.

**Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games**

*by*Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela

**Decision-form games**

*by*Carfì, David

**Reactivity in decision-form games**

*by*Carfì, David

**Price Competition under Limited Comparability**

*by*Piccione, Michele & Spiegler, Ran

**An understanding of influence on human behavior**

*by*Popp, Alexandru W. A.

**Government's Preference and Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting: Perspectives on Privatization and Mixed Duopoly**

*by*Choi, Kangsik

**Utility, games, and narratives**

*by*Fioretti, Guido

**An Agent Based Cournot Simulation with Innovation: Identifying the Determinants of Market Concentration**

*by*Kochanski, Tim

**A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world**

*by*Lahiri, Somdeb

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Can Workers' Expectations Account for the Persistence of Discrimination?**

*by*Filippin, Antonio

**Can Workers' Expectations Account for the Persistence of Discrimination?**

*by*Filippin, Antonio

**Endogeneous Household Interaction**

*by*Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher

**Endogeneous Household Interaction**

*by*Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher

**Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information**

*by*Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbaï, Erwann

**Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?**

*by*Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen & Johan Eyckmans

**Rationalizable Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Endogeneous Household Interaction**

*by*Daniela Del Boca & Christopher Flinn

**Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb**

*by*Christina Matzke & Benedikt Wirth

**Endogeneous Household Interaction**

*by*Daniela Del Boca & Christopher Flinn

**Continuous Implementation**

*by*Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux

**Fairness in Auctions and Task Assignments**

*by*Duygu Yengin

**Robust virtual implementation**

*by*Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen

**Complementariedades dinamicas, eficiencia y equilibrio de Nash en un modelo de firmas y trabajadores**

*by*Elvio Accinelli & Silvia London & Lionello F. Punzo & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

**Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests**

*by*Leininger, Wolfgang

**Axiomatizations of a Positional Power Score and Measure for Hierarchies**

*by*René van den Brink & Frank Steffen

**On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs**

*by*Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig

**Social Interaction in Tax Evasion**

*by*Lipatov, Vilen

**Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem**

*by*Lahiri, Somdeb

**Dominant, weakly stable, uncovered sets: properties and extensions**

*by*Subochev, Andrey

**The epistemic value of rationality**

*by*Popp, Alexandru W. A.

**Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments**

*by*Lahiri, Somdeb

**Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments**

*by*Lahiri, Somdeb

**A Sensitive Flexible Network Approach**

*by*Noemí Navarro

**Statute law or case law?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & A. Riboni

**Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Statute Law or Case Law?**

*by*Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Riboni, Alessandro

**Statute Law or Case Law?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

**Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests**

*by*Wolfgang Leininger

**Statute Law or Case Law?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

**Statute Law or Case Law?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

**A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales**

*by*Christina Matzke, Benedikt Wirth

**An agent-based model of payment systems**

*by*Galbiati, Marco & Soramaki, Kimmo

**Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets**

*by*Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry

**Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets**

*by*Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry

**Coral Games and the Core of Cores**

*by*James Bono

**The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Making Robust Decisions in Discrete Optimization Problems as a Game against Nature**

*by*Adam Kasperski

**The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests**

*by*Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher

**The New Basel Accord and the Nature of Risk: A Game Theoretic Perspective**

*by*Siebe, Wilfried & Milde, Hellmuth & Broll, Udo & Bieta, Volker

**Positional Power in Hierarchies**

*by*René van den Brink & Frank Steffen

**Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims**

*by*William Thomson

**On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency**

*by*Toru Hokari & William Thomson

**Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims**

*by*William Thomson

**Globalization and Country-Specific Service Links**

*by*Stephen S. Golub & Ronald W. Jones & Henryk Kierzkowski

**Attitude polarization**

*by*Ludwig, Alexander & Zimper, Alexander

**Attitude polarization**

*by*Alexander Zimper & Alexander Ludwig

**On the Co-evolution of Insider Information and Idiosyncratic Beliefs**

*by*Thomas Gehrig & Werner Gueth & Rene Levinsky

**Social Memory and Evidence from the Past**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff

**Belief Free Incomplete Information Games**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Pricing without Priors**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag

**Robust Virtual Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Social Memory and Evidence from the Past**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff

**An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games**

*by*V. Pelligra

**Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims**

*by*Diego Dominguez

**Exchange Rate Determination: A Model of the Decisive Role of Central Bank Cooperation and Conflict**

*by*Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten & Sebastian Kube & Johannes Kaiser & JÃ¼rgen von Hagen

**Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information**

*by*Jihong Lee

**A méltányosságelmélet alapjai. Modellek és nézőpontok**

*by*Gulyás, Attila

**Order Statistic Games by Price Takers**

*by*Wang, Gyu Ho & Yi, Kang-Oh

**Rationality of expectations: comparison of neoclassical and evolutionary approaches**

*by*Emilia Tomczyk

**Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries**

*by*Englmaier, Florian & Reisinger, Markus

**Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims**

*by*William Thomson & Chun-Hsien Yeh

**A Characterization of a Family of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims**

*by*William Thomson

**The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof**

*by*William Thomson

**On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims: A Constructive Geometric Approach**

*by*William Thomson

**Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing**

*by*Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran

**Active Courts and Menu Contracts**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**A Deliberative Independent Central Bank**

*by*Erwin Jericha & Martin Schürz

**Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle**

*by*GORDON, Sidartha

**Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle**

*by*GORDON, Sidartha

**Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment**

*by*Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher

**Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment**

*by*Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn

**Active Courts and Menu Contracts**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**ELEVEN - Tests needed for a Recommendation**

*by*Karl Schlag

**Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Active courts and menu contracts**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Building Social Networks**

*by*Robert P. Gilles & Sudipta Sarangi

**Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries**

*by*Florian Englmaier & Markus Reisinger

**Active Courts and Menu Contracts**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment**

*by*Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn

**Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations**

*by*Spiegler, Ran

**On the Convergence of Logit Equilibrium in Order Statistic Games**

*by*Kang-oh Yi

**Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal Game**

*by*López Rafael

**Individual Preferences for Giving**

*by*Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits

**Trust among Strangers**

*by*Teck-Hua Ho & Keith Weigelt

**Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations**

*by*van den Brink, J.R. & Gilles, R.P.

**Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs**

*by*Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S.

**A Concede-and-Divide Rule for Bankruptcy Problems**

*by*Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Maaten, R.

**Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?**

*by*Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews

**Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?**

*by*Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews

**Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?**

*by*Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans

**Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement**

*by*Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman

**Tolerable Intolerance: An Evolutionary Model**

*by*Martin Gregor

**Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag

**Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games**

*by*Abele, S.C. & Stasser, G.

**Information in Mechanism Design**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki

**Information in Mechanism Design**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki

**Robust Monopoly Pricing**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag

**Robust Monopoly Pricing**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag

**Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Thomas Eisenbach & Joan Feigenbaum & Scott Shenker

**Ex Post Implementation**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**A simple modal logic for belief revision**

*by*Giacomo Bonanno

**Network Potentials**

*by*Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles

**Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism**

*by*Raymond Fisman & Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits

**Teoría de la utilidad neoclásica: un juego semántico de interacción estratégica**

*by*Boris Salazar & Andrés Cendales

**Robust Mechanism Design**

*by*Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann

**Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting**

*by*Han, Seungjin

**A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims**

*by*Diego Dominguez & William Thomson

**Positive Harmony Transformations and Equilibrium Selection in Two-Player Games**

*by*Daniel John Zizzo

**Interbanking networks : towards a small financial world ?**

*by*Sébastien Vivier-Lirimont

**La théorie des modèles non coopératifs d'offre de travail et ses applications empiriques**

*by*Olivier Donni

**Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game**

*by*Christophe Deissenberg & Herbert Dawid & Pavel Sevcik

**Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations**

*by*Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles

**Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare**

*by*Michihiro Kandori & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij

**Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje**

*by*Boris Salazar

**The class of opportunity filters and the preference revealed by a path independent choice function**

*by*Somdeb Lahiri

**Burden Sharing in NATO**

*by*John A. Papanastasiou & Ioannis T. Lazaridis & Theofanis Karagiorgos

**Efficient Union Contracts in the Presence of Homogeneous Labor and Differentiated Unions**

*by*Ana Paula Martins & Rui Coimbra

**Multigame models of innovation in evolutionary economics**

*by*M. J. Gagen

**Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations**

*by*René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Discrimination and workers' expectations**

*by*Antonio Filippin

**Discrimination and Workers' Expectations**

*by*Filippin, Antonio

**Discrimination and Workers' Expectations**

*by*Filippin, Antonio

**Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?**

*by*Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite

**Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies**

*by*Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Discrimination and Workers' Expectations**

*by*Filippin, Antonio

**Technology, Organisation and Productivity Performance in Services: Lessons from Britain and the United States, 1870-1990**

*by*Broadberry, Stephen & Sayantan Ghosal

**Robust Mechanism Design**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Robust Mechanism Design**

*by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

**Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect**

*by*Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler

**Burden Sharing In Nato**

*by*John A. Papanastasiou & Ioannis T. Lazaridis & Theofanis Karagiorgos

**Interprétation évolutionniste du changement économique. Une étude comparative**

*by*Giovanni Dosi & Sidney G. Winter

**The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games**

*by*Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W.

**Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players**

*by*Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal

**Social Reciprocity**

*by*Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews

**International environmental agreements - The role of foresight**

*by*DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & SARTZETAKIS, Eftichios

**Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour**

*by*Antonio J. Morales Siles

**A note on the wise girls puzzle**

*by*Mariko Yasugi & Sobei H. Oda

**Pareto-Improving Cheating In An Economic Policy Game**

*by*Christophe Deissenberg and Francisco Alvarez Gonzalez

**Testing Threats in Repeated Games**

*by*Spiegler, R.

**Quantum Market Games**

*by*E. W. Piotrowski & J. Sladkowski

**Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs**

*by*Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm

**Cheating for the common good in a Macroeconomic policy game**

*by*Francisco Álvarez González & Christophe Deissenberg

**Finite Coverings by Cones**

*by*Tijs, S.H. & Reijnierse, J.H.

**A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"**

*by*Beard, Rodney

**A note on Rubinstein's ``Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?"**

*by*Beard, Rodney

**Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

**Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study**

*by*Michael Bacharach & Gerardo A. Guerra

**On the Evolutionary Selection of Nash Equilibrium Components**

*by*Dieter Balkenborg & Karl H. Schlag

**On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma**

*by*Noritsugu Nakanishi

**A value for mixed action-set games**

*by*Emilio Calvo & J. Carlos Santos

**Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics**

*by*Mingli Zheng

**El papel de los costes de transacción en la formación de convenciones**

*by*Jhon James Mora

**Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players**

*by*Khan, A. & Sun, Y.

**The Game Academics Play: Editors Versus Authors**

*by*Joao Ricardo Faria

**On Kolmogorov Complexity and the Costs of Carrying out Strategies**

*by*Justin Smith

**Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games**

*by*Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag

**The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing**

*by*Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen

**Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models**

*by*Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag

**Endogenous local interaction and multi-product firms**

*by*Bauke Visser

**Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective**

*by*Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S.

**Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications**

*by*V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo

**Updating Strategies Through Observed Play - Optimization Under Bounded Rationality**

*by*R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag

**Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility**

*by*Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H.

**On the Connection Between Correlated Equilibria and Sunspot Equilibria**

*by*Davila, J.

**Break-offs in Bargaining, Evidence from a Video Experiment**

*by*Hennig-Schmidt, Heike

**Learning to like what you have: Explaining the endowment effect**

*by*Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg

**The Stationary Distribution of Autonomous Ito Process**

*by*Bakker, A.

**Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution**

*by*Ellison, G.

**Individual and Collective Time-Consistency**

*by*Asheim, G.B.

**Admission and Common Knowledge**

*by*Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M.

**Technological Progress, Mobility and Economic Growth**

*by*Galor, O. & Tsiddon, D.

**Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy**

*by*Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E.

**The Road to Full Employment: Co-ordination in a World of Interdepent Decisions**

*by*Gill, F.

**Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations**

*by*Gaspart, F.

**Decentralization and Collusion**

*by*Baliga, S. & Sjostrom, T.

**Interacive Implementation**

*by*Baliga, S. & Sjostrom, T.

**Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability**

*by*Gale, D. & Rosental, R.W.

**The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result**

*by*Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H

**Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers**

*by*Baliga, S. & Evans, R.

**One against All in the Fictitious Play Process**

*by*Sela, Aner

**Equity, Fairness and Prominence, Determinants for the Behavior of Player Groups in a Bargaining Video Experiment**

*by*Hennig-Schmidt, Heike

**Behavior of Groups as Players in a Bargaining Experiment. Some Results on Negotiation Processes from a Video Experiment**

*by*Hennig-Schmidt, Heike

**On the Interpretation of Evolutionary Stable Sets**

*by*Balkenborg, Dieter & Karl H. Schlag

**Spatial Dispersion in Cournot Competition**

*by*Chamorro, J.M.

**Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities**

*by*Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J.

**Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game**

*by*Giovanni Ponti

**Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem**

*by*Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J.

**On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior**

*by*Björnerstedt, Jonas & Karl H. Schlag

**Which one should I imitate?**

*by*Schlag, Karl H.

**Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure**

*by*Illan Eshel & Emilia Sansone & Avner Shaked

**Preferences Over Solutions to the Margaining Probem**

*by*Border, K.C. & Segal, U.

**Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information**

*by*Forges,F. & Minelli,E.

**Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs**

*by*Tomala, T.

**The Bounds of Bounded Rationality: The Case of Memory Loss**

*by*Hvide, H.K.

**Strike Ballots in a Model with Private Information**

*by*Goerke, L. & Holler, M.J.

**Monitoring,Liquidation,and Security Design**

*by*Repullo,R. & Suarez,J.

**Incentive Compatibility in Large Games**

*by*Nehring, K.

**Incentive Compatibility in Large Games**

*by*Nehring, K.

**Exploitation and Efficiency in Agrarian Contracts**

*by*Chambers, R.G. & Quiggin, J.

**Coalition Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers**

*by*Evans,R.

**Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case**

*by*Maschler, M.

**the Failling Rate of Profit. Entry, Exit, and Coordination with Mixed Strategies**

*by*Vettas, N.

**Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection**

*by*Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L.

**Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities**

*by*Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J.

**Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games**

*by*Luca Anderlini

**The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result**

*by*Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian

**Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits**

*by*Karl H. Schlag

**The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction**

*by*R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag

**Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model**

*by*Illan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked

**Dynamic Stability in Perturbed Games**

*by*R. Cressman & K. H. Schlag

**Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games**

*by*Balkenborg, Dieter & Karl H. Schlag

**Arbitrage in Markets with Unbounded Short Sales: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonemptiness of the Core and Existence of Equilibrium**

*by*Page, F.H.Jr. & Wooders, M.H.

**Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation**

*by*Bhaskar, V.

**When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?**

*by*Karl H. Schlag

**Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result**

*by*Karl H. Schlag

**Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution**

*by*Schlag, Karl H.

**Theorizing Industrial Relations: The Dominance of Logical Positivism and the Shift to Strategic Choice**

*by*Larouche, V. & Audet, M.

**Industrial Relations a Shift Towards "Strategic Choice"?**

*by*Larouche, V. & Audet, M.

**Difference Identities for Unemployment Rates**

*by*George Cave

**Uniformity and games decomposition**

*by*Joseph Abdou & Nikolaos Pnevmatikos & Marco Scarsini

**Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction**

*by*Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher

**Evolutionary Choice of Markets**

*by*Anke Gerber & Marc Oliver Bettzï¿½ge

**The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits**

*by*João Ricardo Faria & Gonçalo Monteiro

**On the Efficiency-Effects of Private (Dis-)Trust in the Government**

*by*Herbert Dawid & Christophe Deissenberg

**On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior**

*by*Jonas Bjoernerstedt & Karl H. Schlag

**Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits**

*by*Karl H. Schlag

**The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction**

*by*R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag

**Utility Rate Equations of Group Population Dynamics in Biological and Social Systems**

*by*Vyacheslav I. Yukalov & E.P. Yukalova & Didier Sornette

**Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games**

*by*Hofbauer, Josef & Karl H. Schlag

**International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight**

*by*Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis

**Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions**

*by*Effrosyni Diamantoudi

**An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design**

*by*Bergemann & Morris