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Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests

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  • Wolfgang Leininger

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Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Leininger, 2009. "Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 341-356, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:3:p:341-356
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9424-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wolfgang Leininger, 2006. "Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 713-719, November.
    2. Avinash Dixit, 2008. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 431-438, Springer.
    3. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1993. "More Efficient Rent-Seeking--A Munchhausen Solution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 43-62, January.
    4. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 211-211.
    5. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 303-310, May.
    6. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2012. "On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 498-501.
    2. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2011. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Working Papers evolutionarily_stable, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Rusche, Christian, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 270, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    4. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    5. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2016. "Bargaining with incomplete information: Evolutionary stability in finite populations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 118-131.
    6. Gu, Yiquan & Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2017. "The Dark Side of the Force: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Entry," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168168, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2021. "Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 206-226.
    8. Gu, Yiquan & Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2019. "Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 469-485.
    9. repec:zbw:rwirep:0270 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2019. "Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict," Working Papers halshs-02291876, HAL.
    11. Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Stracke, Rudi, 2019. "Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 346-365.
    12. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lee, Kyu-Min & Park, Sung-Hoon, 2022. "Evolution of revealing emotions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 597(C).
    13. Sung-Hoon Park & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2022. "Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 349-363, February.
    14. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2021. "The evolutionary stability of in-group altruism in productive and destructive group contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 236-252.
    15. Christian Rusche, 2011. "Does Delegation Help to Prevent Spiteful Behavior?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0270, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    16. Aloys L. Prinz, 2019. "Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-12, May.
    17. Wärneryd, Karl, 2012. "The evolution of preferences for conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 102-104.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; Preference evolution; Evolutionary stability; C79; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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