IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Evolutionary determinants of war

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Morath, Florian

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players' evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74480/1/74699415X.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change with number SP II 2013-302.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013302
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany

Phone: ++49 - 30 - 25491 - 0
Fax: ++49 - 30 - 25491 - 684
Web page: http://www.wzb.eu/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
  2. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 169-203, January.
  3. Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2010. "On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests," MPRA Paper 24640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2010. "Feigning Weakness," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 357-388, July.
  5. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, 2003. "The evolution of preferences and competition: a rationalization of Veblen's theory of invidious comparisons," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 832-859, November.
  6. Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
  7. Wolfgang Leininger, 2003. "On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 177-186, November.
  8. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2012. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Munich Reprints in Economics 13963, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
  10. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007. "Political Bias and War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1353-1373, September.
  11. Andreas Wagener, 2009. "Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2723, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Slantchev, Branislav L. & Tarar, Ahmer S., 2010. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War," MPRA Paper 40558, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2011.
  13. Wolfgang Leininger, 2009. "Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 341-356, September.
  14. Randolph M. Siverson & Michael P. Sullivan, 1983. "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(3), pages 473-494, September.
  15. Suzanne Werner, 1998. "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, June.
  16. Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 2897, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
  18. B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran & Robert J. Oxoby, 2011. "Us and `Them': the origin of identity, and its economic implications," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 719-748, August.
  19. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, December.
  20. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  21. Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2011. "Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 501-520, March.
  22. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013302. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.