Evolutionary determinants of war
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schafferâ€™s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players â€˜evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
|Date of creation:||22 Apr 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009.
"Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future,"
080922, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- McBride, Michael & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2014. "Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 75-89.
- Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 2897, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, .
"Political bias and war,"
1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000.
"Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters,"
99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
- Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2011. "Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 501-520, March.
- Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, 2003. "The evolution of preferences and competition: a rationalization of Veblen's theory of invidious comparisons," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 832-859, November.
- Boudreau, James W. & Shunda, Nicholas, 2012.
"On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests,"
Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 498-501.
- Andreas Wagener, 2009.
"Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2723, CESifo Group Munich.
- Andreas Wagener, 2013. "Tax Competition, Relative Performance, And Policy Imitation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1251-1264, November.
- Slantchev, Branislav L., 2010. "Feigning Weakness," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 357-388, July.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. & Tarar, Ahmer S., 2010. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War," MPRA Paper 40558, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2011.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2003. "On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 177-186, November.
- Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2003.
"Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
03_01, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
- Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
- Suzanne Werner, 1998. "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, June.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2009. "Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 341-356, September.
- Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
- Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(01), pages 169-203, January.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran & Robert J. Oxoby, 2011. "Us and `Them': the origin of identity, and its economic implications," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 719-748, August.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:418. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.