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Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

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  • Herbst, Luisa
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Morath, Florian

Abstract

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.

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  • Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:168-184
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.013
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    3. Topi Miettinen & Olli Ropponen & Pekka Sääskilahti, 2020. "Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1535-1574, October.
    4. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2022. "Insecure Property Rights and Conflicts: How to Solve Them?," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-32, December.
    5. Riccardo Pansini & Marco Campennì & Lei Shi, 2020. "Segregating socioeconomic classes leads to an unequal redistribution of wealth," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(1), pages 1-10, December.
    6. Yang‐Ming Chang & Shih‐Jye Wu, 2020. "Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1338-1371, April.
    7. Langtry, Alastair, 2024. "Inside the West Wing: Lobbying as a contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Balance of power; Contest; Bargaining; Nash demand game; Conflict resolution; Asymmetries; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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