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Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?

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  • Donald Wittman

Abstract

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Wittman, 2009. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 588-602, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:53:y:2009:i:3:p:588-602
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. Wagner, R. Harrison, 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 593-607, September.
    3. Robert Powell, 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 344-361, April.
    4. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 621-632, November.
    5. Gartzke, Erik, 1999. "War Is in the Error Term," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 567-587, July.
    6. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Barry R. Weingast, 2017. "Adam Smith’s Theory of Violence and the Political Economics of Development," NBER Chapters, in: Organizations, Civil Society, and the Roots of Development, pages 51-81, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Adam Meirowitz & Massimo Morelli & Kristopher W. Ramsay & Francesco Squintani, 2019. "Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 378-418.

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