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Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war

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  • William Spaniel

Abstract

In many contexts, patrons wish to simultaneously increase a protégé’s military power while reducing the probability of war between that protégé and its enemy. Are these goals compatible? I show that the answer is yes when states face uncertainty over a class of military allotments. Arms transfers mitigate the information problem by making both strong and weak types behave more similarly. This encourages uninformed states to make safer demands, which decreases the probability of war. As a result, transfers to the informed actor both increase bargaining power and enhance efficiency under these conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • William Spaniel, 2020. "Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 538-556, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:4:p:538-556
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Nicolò, 2022. "Learning it the hard way: Conflicts, economic sanctions and military aids," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0284, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".

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