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Bargaining and the Nature of War

Author

Listed:
  • Alastair Smith

    (Department of Politics, New York University)

  • Allan C. Stam

    (Department of Government, Dartmouth College)

Abstract

A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:783-813
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 191, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
    3. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Häfner, Samuel, 2012. "Clausewitz on Auctions," Working papers 2012/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    5. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
    6. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010. "Peace agreements without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
    7. Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 163-183, May.
    8. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    9. Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2007. "Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4192, The World Bank.
    10. Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2010. "Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 123-143, April.
    11. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Kıbrıs Arzu & Kıbrıs Özgür, 2016. "On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 1-25, January.
    13. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.

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