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The positive foundation of the common prior assumption

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  • Heifetz, Aviad

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  • Heifetz, Aviad, 2006. "The positive foundation of the common prior assumption," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 105-120, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:1:p:105-120
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    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    2. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 172-174, July.
    3. Samet, Dov, 2000. "Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 169-185, December.
    4. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. MERTENS , Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part A : Background Material," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Feinberg, Yossi, 2000. "Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 127-179, April.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1999. "How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 409-434.
    8. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
    9. Morris, Stephen, 1995. "The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 227-253, October.
    10. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2002. "Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 316-355, October.
    11. , & ,, 2011. "Agreeing to agree," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    12. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-1347, November.
    13. J. T. Chang & D. Pollard, 1997. "Conditioning as disintegration," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 51(3), pages 287-317, November.
    14. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
    15. Faruk Gul, 1998. "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 923-928, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Tsakas, Elias, 2021. "Common priors under endogenous uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12062r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2013.
    3. Hellman, Ziv, 2011. "Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 163-171, May.
    4. Burkhard C. Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2007. "Unawareness, Beliefs and Games," Working Papers 235, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Ziv Hellman, 2014. "Countable spaces and common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 193-213, February.
    6. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    7. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2014. "Speculative trade under unawareness: the infinite case," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 147-160, October.
    8. Ziv Hellman & Miklós Pintér, 2022. "Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 567-587, November.
    9. , & ,, 2017. "Bayesian games with a continuum of states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    10. João Correia-da-Silva, 2010. "Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states of nature," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 291-302, October.
    11. Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
    12. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    13. Werner Güth & Loreto Erviti & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2011. "Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 843-852, December.
    14. Chen, Yi-Chun & Lehrer, Ehud & Li, Jiangtao & Samet, Dov & Shmaya, Eran, 2015. "Agreeing to agree and Dutch books," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 108-116.
    15. Galanis, Spyros, 2018. "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 598-615.
    16. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    17. Lipman, Barton L., 2010. "Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 56-70, January.
    18. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    19. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2007. "Unawareness, Beliefs and Games," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 196, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    20. João Correia-da-Silva, 2008. "Agreeing to disagree in a countable space of equiprobable states," FEP Working Papers 260, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    21. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2014. "Speculative trade under unawareness: the infinite case," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 147-160, October.
    22. Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Belief consistency and trade consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 165-177.
    23. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellman, Ziv, 2019. "No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 161-184.
    24. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.

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    8. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2002. "Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 316-355, October.
    9. Hellman, Ziv, 2011. "Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 163-171, May.
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