Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets
We observe that the set of all priors of an agent is the convex hull of his types. A prior common to all agents exists, if the sets of the agents' priors have a point in common. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the intersection of several closed convex subsets of the simplex, which is an extension of the separation theorem. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of common prior is a special case of this.
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- Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-1347, November.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated".
"Fundamental Agreement: A New Foundation For The Harsanyi Doctrine,"
Department of Economics
96-02, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Klaus Nehring & Giacomo Bonanno & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2003. "Fundamental Agreement: A new foundation for the Harsanyi Doctrine," Working Papers 962, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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