Agreeing to agree
Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do* coincide? A necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty *finite* event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$. Second, this still holds true at F, when F becomes common knowledge.
References listed on IDEAS
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