Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures
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- Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2011. "Agreeing to agree," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
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KeywordsCommon knowledge; Common prior; Posterior;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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