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On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol

Listed author(s):
  • Tsakas, Elias
  • Voorneveld, Mark

The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among Bayesian agents to cases where the structure of the communication protocol is not commonly known. We show that, even under standard strict conditions on the structure of the protocols and the nature of the transmitted signals, a consensus may never be reached if very little asymmetric information about the protocol is introduced.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030440681100111X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 733-739

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:733-739
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.003
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  2. Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 722-731, March.
  3. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
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  5. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 3, pages 43-57 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
  7. Houy, Nicolas & Ménager, Lucie, 2008. "Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 140-152, November.
  8. Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
  9. Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October.
  10. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
  11. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
  12. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
  13. Heifetz, Aviad, 1996. "Comment on Consensus without Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 273-277, July.
  14. Koessler, Frederic, 2001. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 139-159, September.
  15. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
  16. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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