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Agreeing to Disagree


  • Robert J Aumann


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  • Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:512

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    1. Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
    2. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
    3. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
    5. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
    6. Basu, Kaushik, 1988. "Strategic irrationality in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 247-260, June.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    8. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    9. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    10. D. Pearce, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 523, David K. Levine.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-794, July.
    13. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    14. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
    15. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    16. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
    17. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    18. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
    19. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
    20. Gul, Faruk, 1996. "Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-31, July.
    21. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
    22. D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 382, David K. Levine.
    23. Ben-Porath, E., 1992. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games," Papers 14-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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