Consensus, Communication and Knowledge : an Extension with Bayesian Agents
We extend the result of Parikh and Krasucki  to the case where the set of available decisions is arbitrary. We show that if agents are bayesian and choose the action that maximizes their expected utility, then word of mouth communication leads to the equality of all decisions.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2006|
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- Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
- Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October.
- Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
- Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982.
"We can't disagree forever,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
- Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
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