Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet
I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree not to bet.
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Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(1), pages 207-16, February.
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- Robin Hanson, 1998. "Consensus By Identifying Extremists," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 293-301, June.
- Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, August.
- Hanson, Robin, 2002. "Disagreement is unpredictable," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 365-369, November.
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