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Talking with an extremist

Author

Listed:
  • Emiliano Catonini

    (NYU Shanghai)

  • Tatiana Mayskaya

    (HSE University)

Abstract

Two agents announce the state they consider most likely infinitely many times. A small departure from common belief in rationality can have a severe impact on the belief about the state and on the behavior of an extremist: while initial periods of disagreement produce a temporary convergence of beliefs, prolonged disagreement induces reversion towards the initial belief. The mechanism is simple: the longer the counterpart insists on the opposite view, the more the extremist doubts that the counterpart is intellectually capable and honest, and therefore the more he discounts the counterpart’s opinion.

Suggested Citation

  • Emiliano Catonini & Tatiana Mayskaya, 2024. "Talking with an extremist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 675-697, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:77:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01500-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01500-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disagreement; Almost common belief; Polarization; Misspecification; Bounded rationality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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