Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines
We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal equilibria, in which agents condition only on how their signals rank their actions and not on signal strength, lead to simple patterns of behavior that have a natural interpretation as routines. These routine spartially solve the teamâ€™s coordination problem by synchronizing the teamâ€™s search efforts and prove to be resilient to changes in the environment by being expost equilibria, to agents having only a coarse understanding of other agentsâ€™ strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of agentsâ€™ overcon?dence. The price of this resilience is that optimal routines are frequently not optimal equilibria.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.sfbtr15.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-65, March.
- David A. Miller, 2005.
"The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003.
"Private Monitoring in Auctions,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, November.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium,"
784828000000000106, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003.
"Strategic learning in games with symmetric information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
- O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Post-Print hal-00464978, HAL.
- GOSSNER, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," CORE Discussion Papers 1998023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
- repec:pit:wpaper:382 is not listed on IDEAS
- Andreas Blume & John Duffy, 2004. "Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation," 2004 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jacques Crémer & Luis Garicano & Andrea Prat, 2007.
"Language and the Theory of the Firm,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 373-407.
- Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, 03.
- Robert S. Gibbons, 2010.
"Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000249, David K. Levine.
- Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 337-365, 09.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:355. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tamilla Benkelberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.