Modes of Communication
The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue-relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Dec 2004|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, n°6, décembre 2005, p. 1217-1238.|
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ULB Institutional Repository
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- Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 809-839.
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- Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-1146, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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