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Entrepreneurs and New Ideas

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  • Biais, Bruno
  • Perotti, Enrico

Abstract

We study how early-stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea-thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he should in turn steal the idea. Thus, stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary. In such cases, the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts, thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other's information. Yet, very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them. Copyright (c) 2008, RAND.
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Suggested Citation

  • Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico, 2008. "Entrepreneurs and New Ideas," IDEI Working Papers 347, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 0000.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:4373
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Farre-Mensa & Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2017. "What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery”," NBER Working Papers 23268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2017. "Sequential Innovation, Naked Exclusion, and Upfront Lump-Sum Payments," CESifo Working Paper Series 6412, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    4. Pietro Tommasino, 2006. "The Political Economy of Investor Protection," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 604, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Tykvova, Tereza, 2007. "Who chooses whom? Syndication, skills and reputation," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 5-28.
    6. Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez & Sheridan Titman, 2009. "Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 871-900, September.
    7. Dessí, Roberta & Yin, Nina, 2015. "Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Thomas Hellmann & Enrico Perotti, 2011. "The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(10), pages 1813-1826, October.
    9. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    10. Walter Buhr, 2009. "Infrastructure of the Market Economy," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 132-09, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    11. Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz & Jochen Christian Werth, 2016. "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Experience, Education, and Exit," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 507-525, November.
    12. Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
    13. Grossman, Herschel I., 2005. "Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 269-285, June.
    14. Kanatas George & Stefanadis Christodoulos, 2010. "Can Venture Capital Be a Curse?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-28, July.
    15. Alexandre Gaudeul, 2004. "Open Source Software Development Patterns and License Terms," Industrial Organization 0409008, EconWPA.
    16. Farre-Mensa, Joan & Hegde, Deepak & Ljungqvist, Alexander P., 2016. "The Bright Side of Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 11091, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Prüfer, J., 2009. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper 2009-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Meagher, Kieron & Prasad, Suraj, 2016. "Career concerns and team talent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-17.
    19. Patrick Herbst & Uwe Walz, 2017. "The Design of Vertical R&D Collaborations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(333), pages 54-77, January.
    20. Oren Bar-Gill & Nicola Persico, 2016. "Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 230-267, November.
    21. Bayar, Onur & Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Liu, Mark H., 2011. "A theory of equity carve-outs and negative stub values under heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 616-638, June.
    22. Marini, Marco A., 2005. "The value of a new idea: knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure," MPRA Paper 1687, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2006.
    23. Cumming, Douglas & Walz, Uwe & Werth, Jochen Christian, 2015. "The dynamics of entrepreneurial careers in high-tech ventures: Experience, education, and exit," SAFE Working Paper Series 122, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    24. Dominique Demougin & Oliver Fabel, 2006. "The Division of Ownership in New Ventures," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-047, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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