Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Behavior of Individual Preferences under Moral Hazard
We consider the effect of alternative individual preference towards effort conditional on aggregate risk in a principal-agent relationship under moral hazard. We find that agents can explore a negative correlation between individual preference towards effort and aggregate risk to further diversify idiosyncratic risk and increase expected utility under moral hazard. The variation of individual preference towards effort may mitigate the impact of moral hazard on the risk premium, but we find this to be quantitatively small.
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