Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts
In this paper we model contract incompleteness "from the ground up," as arising endogenously from the costs of describing the environment and the parties' behavior. Optimal contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: discretion, meaning that the contract does not specify the parties' behavior with sufficient detail; and rigidity, meaning that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently contingent on the external state. The model sheds light on the determinants of rigidity and discretion in contracts, and yields rich predictions regarding the impact of changes in the exogenous parameters on the degree and form of contract incompleteness. (JEL D23, D8, L14)
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Volume (Year): 92 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1992.
"Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts,"
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-26, January.
- Allen, F. & Gale, D., 1990. "Measurement Distortion And Missing Contingencies In Optimal Contracts," Weiss Center Working Papers 26-90, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research.
- Nabil J Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2002.
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
431, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Nabil Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2002. "Unforeseen contingencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3578, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2002. "Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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