Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages
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- Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2012. "Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages," Working Papers 2012.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2017.
"Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties,"
2017.02, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2017. "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ET: Economic Theory 253215, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi & Sergio Vergalli, 2013.
"Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 25-43, September.
- Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi & Sergio Vergalli, 2012. "Time Overruns as Opportunistic Behavior in Public Procurement," Working Papers 2012.78, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
More about this item
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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