Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties
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- Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2017. "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ET: Economic Theory 253215, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic Procurement; Fixed-price Contracts; Real Options; Time Overruns; Scoring Auctions; Liquidated Damages;
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2017-02-12 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PPM-2017-02-12 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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