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Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: the Design of Financial Claims

In this paper we show that the "Coase problem" of the private oversupply of inputs applies equally to investors supplying capital to firms. Investors would like to commit to supplying only the monopoly amount of capital to an industry, but ex-post may be tempted to fund a second firm, devaluing the investment of the first entrepreneur.

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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 99.525.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.525
Contact details of provider: Postal: GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.
Phone: 05.61.62.85.56
Fax: 05 61 22 55 63
Web page: http://www-gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr/
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  1. Robert Gertner & Robert Gibbons & David Scharfstein, 1987. "Simultaneous Signaling to the Capital and Product Markets," Working papers 449, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Judith A. Chevalier & David S. Scharfstein, 1994. "Capital Market Imperfections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 4614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May.
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  6. Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellmann, . "Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization," Working Papers 103, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  7. Vojislav Maksimovic, 1988. "Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 389-407, Autumn.
  8. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
  9. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 184-216, April.
  10. Gonzalez-Maestre, M. & Granero, L.M., 1997. "Industrial Loans and Market Structure," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 396.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  11. Roger H. Gordon, 1994. "Fiscal Policy during the Transition in Eastern Europe," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 37-70 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
  13. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
  14. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1999. "Agency Costs, Firm Behaviour and the Nature of Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2130, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Showalter, Dean M, 1995. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 647-53, June.
  16. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 2000. "Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on private equity valuation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 281-325, February.
  17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
  18. Sahlman, William A. & Stevenson, Howard H., 1985. "Capital market myopia," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 7-30.
  19. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  20. Evans, David S & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 808-27, August.
  21. Gorman, Michael & Sahlman, William A., 1989. "What do venture capitalists do?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 231-248, July.
  22. Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1982. " Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 371-84, May.
  23. Roman Frydman & Edmund S. Phelps & Andrzej Rapaczynski & Andrei Shleifer, 1993. "Needed mechanisms of corporate governance and finance in Eastern Europe 1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(2), pages 171-207, 06.
  24. Saunders, Anthony, 1994. "Banking and commerce: An overview of the public policy issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 231-254, January.
  25. Martin Stephen, 1993. "Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 445-450, April.
  26. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1992. "Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 795-812, October.
  27. J. Bradford De Long, 1990. "Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value? A Historical Perspective on Financial Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 3426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  29. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
  30. Chevalier, Judith A, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 415-35, June.
  31. Michel Poitevin, 1989. "Collusion and the Banking Structure of a Duopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 263-77, May.
  32. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Chiesa Gabriella, 1995. "Proprietary Information, Financial Intermediation, and Research Incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 328-357, October.
  33. Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta, 1999. "Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1291-1323, 08.
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