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Management of Knowledge Workers

We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate effort, while firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain positive profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163864
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Paper provided by Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2006/7.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 04 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2006_007
Contact details of provider: Postal:
NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

Phone: +47 55 95 92 93
Fax: +47 55 95 96 50
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/en/research-faculty/department-of-business-and-management-science.aspx
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