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The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature

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  • Jean Lanjouw
  • Josh Lerner

Abstract

This paper examines several recent avenues of empirical research into the enforcement of intellectual property rights. To frame these issues, we start with a stylized model of the patent litigation process. The bulk of the paper is devoted to linking the empirical literature on patent litigation to the parameters of this model. The four major areas we consider are (i) how the propensity to litigate patents varies with the expected benefits of litigation, (ii) the ways in which the cost of litigation affects the willingness to enforce patents, (iii) how the cost of enforcing patents changes the private value of patent rights, and (iv) the impact of intellectual property litigation on the innovation process itself.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1998. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 49-50, pages 223-246.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:223-246
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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