IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/indorg/v38y2015icp32-43.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The 80/20 rule: Corporate support for innovation by employees

Author

Listed:
  • Krasteva, Silvana
  • Sharma, Priyanka
  • Wagman, Liad

Abstract

We model an employee's decision to pursue an innovative idea at his employing firm (internally) or as a start-up (externally). We characterize an idea by its market profitability and the degree of positive/negative externality that it imposes on the employing firm's profits. The innovation process consists of exploration and development. Exploring an idea internally grants the employee access to exploration support provided by the firm but reduces his appropriability of the idea. We demonstrate that ideas exhibiting weak externalities are explored and developed externally, whereas ideas with strong externalities are explored and handled internally. Moderate externalities are associated with internal exploration but subsequent external development. An increase in the firm's exploration support attracts internal exploration of a wider range of ideas but may increase the likelihood of subsequent external development. We further show that while the optimal level of exploration support rises with the firm's innovation appropriability, overall profits may decline.

Suggested Citation

  • Krasteva, Silvana & Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2015. "The 80/20 rule: Corporate support for innovation by employees," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 32-43.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:38:y:2015:i:c:p:32-43
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.11.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718714001209
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Motivating Innovation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1823-1860, October.
    2. Thomas Åstebro & Jing Chen & Peter Thompson, 2011. "Stars and Misfits: Self-Employment and Labor Market Frictions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(11), pages 1999-2017, November.
    3. Klepper, Steven, 2010. "The origin and growth of industry clusters: The making of Silicon Valley and Detroit," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 15-32, January.
    4. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
    5. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-123, March.
    6. Gans, Joshua S. & Stern, Scott, 2003. "The product market and the market for "ideas": commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 333-350, February.
    7. Christensen, Clayton M., 1993. "The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial and Technological Turbulence," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 531-588, January.
    8. Roman Inderst & Manuel Klein, 2007. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 881-904, December.
    9. Pakes, Ariel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1983. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(4), pages 345-365, October.
    10. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
    11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    12. Bruno Cassiman & Masako Ueda, 2006. "Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-ups," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 262-275, February.
    13. Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2011. "Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 78-128, February.
    14. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    15. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1995. "Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 362-378, October.
    17. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter.
    18. Steven Klepper & Sally Sleeper, 2005. "Entry by Spinoffs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(8), pages 1291-1306, August.
    19. Thomas Hellmann, 2007. "When Do Employees Become Entrepreneurs?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(6), pages 919-933, June.
    20. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1983. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 741-748, September.
    21. April Mitchell Franco & Darren Filson, 2006. "Spin‐outs: knowledge diffusion through employee mobility," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 841-860, December.
    22. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:i:4:p:841-860 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "A theory of strategic venture investing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 285-314, May.
    24. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    25. Antonio E. Bernardo & Hongbin Cai & Jiang Luo, 2009. "Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 1089-1118, March.
    26. Peter Thompson & Jing Chen, 2011. "Disagreements, employee spinoffs and the choice of technology," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 455-474, July.
    27. Wiggins, Steven N, 1995. "Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Endogenous Ownership, and the Limits to Firm Size," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(1), pages 54-69, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jian Jia & Ginger Zhe Jin & Liad Wagman, 2018. "The Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture Investment," NBER Working Papers 25248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Minja Bolesnikov & Milica Popović Stijačić & Mladen Radišić & Aleksandar Takači & Jelena Borocki & Dragana Bolesnikov & Paula Bajdor & Joanna Dzieńdziora, 2019. "Development of a Business Model by Introducing Sustainable and Tailor-Made Value Proposition for SME Clients," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(4), pages 1-16, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; R&D; Entrepreneurship; Exploration support;

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:38:y:2015:i:c:p:32-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.