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Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing

Author

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  • Felli, Leonardo
  • Hortala-Vallve, Rafael

Abstract

Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and wrongdoing on the part of governments and corporations. In this paper we show how, at a micro level, whistle-blowing can be used as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00015060
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00015060
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca & Ponce, Jorge, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-104.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; blackmail; whistle-blowing; organizations; mechanism design; communication; opportunistic behavior;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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