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Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information

  • O. Gossner
  • N. Vieille

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2000-27.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2000-27
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  1. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  2. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
  3. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October.
  4. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  5. Nimrod Megiddo, 1979. "On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by Non-Bayesian Players," Discussion Papers 373, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  7. Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin, 1998. "Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 201-210.
  8. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, June.
  9. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  11. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
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