Rational Multi-Agent Search
We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal distribution of success profiles over his actions. We characterize optimal joint search strategies.
|Date of creation:||03 Dec 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
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- Bhaskar, V., 2000. "Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 247-262, August.
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Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
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- O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Post-Print hal-00464978, HAL.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6379 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, 03. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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