A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004
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- Francoise Forges, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Post-Print hal-01252953, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015.
"Bayesian repeated games and reputation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
- Antoine Salomon & Françoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-02276762, HAL.
- Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-01252921, HAL.
- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018.
"Sender–receiver games with cooperation,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 52-61.
- Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017. "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 17, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst, 2018. "Sender-receiver games with cooperation," Post-Print hal-02313962, HAL.
- Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016.
"Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 11-36, March.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Working Papers hal-01094061, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-02276751, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2015. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," Post-Print hal-01252950, HAL.
- Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016.
"Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
- Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
- Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bayesian game; Commitment; Contract; Incentive compatibility; Interim individual rationality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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