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Program equilibrium

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  • Tennenholtz, Moshe

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  • Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Program equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 363-373, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:363-373
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    3. Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2001. "On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 197-211, April.
    4. Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 1999. "Distributed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 55-72, July.
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    6. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    7. Zemel, Eitan, 1989. "Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-9, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 953-973.
    2. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Wiebe Hoek & Cees Witteveen & Michael Wooldridge, 2013. "Program equilibrium—a program reasoning approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 639-671, August.
    4. Juan I Block & David K Levine, 2016. "A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001323, David K. Levine.
    5. Karl Wärneryd, 2014. "Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5089, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon, 2016. "Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 11-36, March.
    7. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2017. "A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 9-19, April.
    8. Lance Fortnow & Rahul Santhanam, 2009. "Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time," Discussion Papers 1481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
    10. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:297-315 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
    12. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
    13. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.

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