Monetary trading: An Optimal Exchange System
We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an efficient way to achieve those properties.
|Date of creation:||05 Sep 2003|
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