Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
More about this item
KeywordsBounded rationality; Discounting; Uniform equilibria; Factoring game;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EVO-2010-01-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-01-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2010-01-23 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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