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An Economy of AI Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Gillian K. Hadfield
  • Andrew Koh

Abstract

In the coming decade, artificially intelligent agents with the ability to plan and execute complex tasks over long time horizons with little direct oversight from humans may be deployed across the economy. This chapter surveys recent developments and highlights open questions for economists around how AI agents might interact with humans and with each other, shape markets and organizations, and what institutions might be required for well-functioning markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Gillian K. Hadfield & Andrew Koh, 2025. "An Economy of AI Agents," Papers 2509.01063, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2509.01063
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    References listed on IDEAS

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