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The role of relationship scope in sustaining relational contracts in interfirm networks

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  • Nicholas Argyres
  • Janet Bercovitz
  • Giorgio Zanarone

Abstract

Research summary A key strategic decision for many firms is the scope of their relationships with partners. Existing theories of relationship scope are limited in that they disregard the facts that: (a) most firms transact within networks of multiple partners, and (b) these partnerships often involve two‐sided moral hazard. We develop a theory of partnership scope in interfirm networks that addresses these deficiencies. We show how, by broadening the scope of business it conducts with its partners, a firm can reduce externalities between them, and thereby sustain self‐enforcing exchange relationships (“relational contracts”) in which both parties cooperate with each other repeatedly and maximize the value created. We discuss numerous settings in which our model applies, including franchising, supply chains, and platform‐based ecosystems. Managerial summary A key strategic decision for many firms is the number of transactions or activities they conduct with a given supplier, business customer, or company that sells complementary products or services. We offer a theory to explain why firms often prefer relationships with broader scope. Whereas other theories are based on the ability to leverage partner knowledge or cheaper supervision, our theory is based on the concept of a “relational contract”, in which a firm and its partner cooperate with each other repeatedly according to an informal agreement between them. We show that under relational contracting, broader scope relationships encourage better mutual cooperation than narrow scope relationships, thereby maximizing the value created by them. We discuss how our model applies to franchising, supply chains, and platform‐based ecosystems.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas Argyres & Janet Bercovitz & Giorgio Zanarone, 2020. "The role of relationship scope in sustaining relational contracts in interfirm networks," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 222-245, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:41:y:2020:i:2:p:222-245
    DOI: 10.1002/smj.3095
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    3. Matthias Fahn & Giorgio Zanarone, 2021. "Pay Transparency under Subjective Performance Evaluation," Economics working papers 2021-02, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
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    5. Bo Liu & Yun-Fei Shao & Guowei Liu & Debing Ni, 2022. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Relational Governance in an Innovation Ecosystem," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, April.
    6. Matthias Fahn & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Transparency in relational contracts," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 1046-1071, May.
    7. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.
    8. George Chondrakis & Mari Sako, 2020. "When suppliers shift my boundaries: Supplier employee mobility and its impact on buyer firms' sourcing strategy," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(9), pages 1682-1711, September.
    9. Wang, Kedi & Huo, Baofeng & Tian, Min, 2021. "How to protect specific investments from opportunism: A moderated mediation model of customer integration and transformational leadership," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    10. Yanling Yang & Yanling Zheng & Guojie Xie & Yu Tian, 2022. "The Influence Mechanism of Strategic Partnership on Enterprise Performance: Exploring the Chain Mediating Role of Information Sharing and Supply Chain Flexibility," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-23, April.
    11. Feng Gao & Rong Zhong, 2023. "Information environment and interfirm alliance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 643-677, February.
    12. Münch, Christopher & Marx, Emanuel, 2022. "Supply ecosystems and the concept of resilience: A literature review," Chapters from the Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics (HICL), in: Kersten, Wolfgang & Jahn, Carlos & Blecker, Thorsten & Ringle, Christian M. (ed.), Changing Tides: The New Role of Resilience and Sustainability in Logistics and Supply Chain Management – Innovative Approaches for the Shift to a New , volume 33, pages 39-66, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Institute of Business Logistics and General Management.
    13. Sébastien Houde & Wenjun Wang, 2022. "The Incidence of the U.S.-China Solar Trade War," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 22/372, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

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