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Using Hostages to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Partial Equity Stakes in Japanese Automotive Supply Relationships

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  • Christina Ahmadjian
  • Joanne Oxley

Abstract

We examine the use of partial equity stakes and volume-based dependence balancing in Japanese automotive supply relationships. Building on Williamson's (1983) hostage model, we argue that the robustness of different types of hostage arrangement depends on the value, durability, and observability of the underlying hostages involved. In Japan, strong norms of obligation associated with equity affiliation, along with significant obstacles to equity divestment, make a partial equity stake a robust hostage-based arrangement. Volume-based dependence balancing--whereby an assembler skews purchase quantities toward suppliers that commit more of their capacity to serving that assembler's needs--constitutes a less robust form of hostage in this context. Volume-based dependence balancing may nonetheless be an effective arrangement when contracting hazards are more moderate. Our empirical analysis provides support for these arguments: We find evidence that Japanese auto assemblers hold equity stakes in those suppliers that would otherwise be particularly vulnerable to assembler opportunism; in relationships without equity investments, assemblers systematically manage their purchase volumes in a manner that is also consistent with efforts to make credible commitments to otherwise vulnerable suppliers. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina Ahmadjian & Joanne Oxley, 2006. "Using Hostages to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Partial Equity Stakes in Japanese Automotive Supply Relationships," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 213-233, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:213-233
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewj003
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    Cited by:

    1. Alireza Naghavi & Shin-Kun Peng & Yingyi Tsai, 2017. "Relationship-specific Investments and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement with Heterogeneous Suppliers," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 626-648, August.
    2. Globerman, Steven & Nielsen, Bo Bernhard, 2007. "Equity versus non-equity international strategic alliances involving Danish firms: An empirical investigation of the relative importance of partner and host country determinants," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 449-471, December.
    3. Joanne Oxley & Tetsuo Wada, 2009. "Alliance Structure and the Scope of Knowledge Transfer: Evidence from U.S.-Japan Agreements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(4), pages 635-649, April.
    4. Bidault, Francis & de la Torre, José R. & Zanakis, Stelios H. & Ring, Peter Smith, 2018. "Willingness to rely on trust in global business collaborations: Context vs. demography," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 373-391.
    5. Lamar Pierce, 2012. "Organizational Structure and the Limits of Knowledge Sharing: Incentive Conflict and Agency in Car Leasing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1106-1121, June.
    6. Hermano, Víctor & Martín-Cruz, Natalia, 2013. "How to Deliver Foreign Aid? The Case of Projects Governed by the Spanish International Agency," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 298-314.
    7. Ricard Gil & Giorgio Zanarone, 2016. "New Frontiers in Empirical Research on Informal Contracting," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 390-407, June.
    8. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    9. Lincoln, James R. & Guillot, Didier, 2011. "Business Groups, Networks, And Embeddedness: Innovation And Implementation Alliances In Japanese Electronics, 1985-1998," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt35g695gn, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    10. Albert Jolink & Eva Niesten, 2012. "Hybrid Governance," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Alexander Schmitt, 2022. "Testing predictions on supplier governance from the global value chains literature [Using hostages to support exchange: dependence balancing and partial equity stakes in Japanese automotive supply ," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 31(1), pages 89-111.
    12. Harada, Tsutomu, 2015. "Structural change and economic growth with relation-specific investment," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-10.
    13. Nicholas Argyres & Janet Bercovitz & Giorgio Zanarone, 2020. "The role of relationship scope in sustaining relational contracts in interfirm networks," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 222-245, February.

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