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Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts

Author

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  • Joel Watson

    (Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093, USA)

Abstract

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and external enforcement, accommodating alternative assumptions regarding how actively the parties initially set and renegotiate the terms of their contract. A progression of theoretical components is reviewed, building from the recursive formulation of equilibrium continuation values in repeated games. A principal-agent setting serves as a running example.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:13:y:2021:p:631-659
    DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-110736
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1589-1646, December.
    2. Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 673-700.
    3. Salcedo, Bruno & Sultanum, Bruno & Zhou, Ruilin, 2025. "A crises-bailouts game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    4. repec:cdl:ucsdec:qt2dg817mv is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dominique Demougin & Benjamin Bental, 2025. "Procedural vs. Substantive Approaches in Non-Comprehensive Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 11861, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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