Procedural vs. Substantive Approaches in Non-Comprehensive Contracts
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More about this item
Keywords
moral hazard; incentive contracting.;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2025-05-26 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2025-05-26 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2025-05-26 (Microeconomics)
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