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Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device

  • Benjamin Bental
  • Bruno Deffains
  • Dominique Demougin
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00327.x
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    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

    Volume (Year): 21 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (03)
    Pages: 31-52

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:31-52
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/

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    1. Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
    2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19773, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2006. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 5768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    5. Ola Kvaløy, 2007. "Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 551-572, 09.
    6. Helpman, Elhanan, 2006. "Trade, FDI and the Organization of Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
    8. Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
    9. Karsten Bjerring Olsen, 2006. "Productivity Impacts of Offshoring and Outsourcing: A Review," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2006/1, OECD Publishing.
    10. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
    11. Strausz, R.G., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2007. "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," NBER Working Papers 13350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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