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Property Rights

In: : The Handbook of Organizational Economics

  • Ilya Segal
  • Michael D.Whinston

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This chapter was published in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.) : The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pages , 2012.
This item is provided by Princeton University Press in its series Introductory Chapters with number 9889-3.
Handle: RePEc:pup:chapts:9889-3
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://press.princeton.edu

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