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Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail

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  • Joel Watson

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties’ individual trade actions. The sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs, under various assumptions about renegotiation opportunities, are characterized and compared. The results indicate the benefit of modeling trade actions as individual, rather than as public, and they highlight the usefulness of a structured game-theoretic framework for applied research.
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  • Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000006
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    File URL: http://econ.ucsd.edu/papers/files/2002-04.pdf
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