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Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments

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  • Stremitzer, Alexander

Abstract

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a 'specific performance' regime which grants the breached-against buyer an option to choose 'restitution' if the tender's value falls below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).

Suggested Citation

  • Stremitzer, Alexander, 2008. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 242, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:242
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    Cited by:

    1. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2015. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 318-346, August.
    2. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
    3. Daniel Göller, 2014. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 473-498.
    4. Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
    6. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
    7. Schweizer, Urs, 2016. "Efficient incentives from obligation law and the compensation principle," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
    8. Agamirova, Maria Е. (Агамирова, Мария) & Dzagurova, Nataliya B. (Дзагурова, Наталия), 2016. "The Legality of Vertical Restraints by the Rule of Reason and the Character of the Specific Investments [Правомерность Вертикальных Ограничивающих Соглашений С Позиции "Взвешенного Подхода&quo," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 122-137, December.
    9. Zhiqi Chen & Xiaoqiao Wang, 2020. "Specific investment, supplier vulnerability and profit risks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1215-1237, October.
    10. Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, 2020. "Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 33-72.
    11. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 282, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    12. Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    13. Christoph Engel & Lars Freund, 2017. "Behaviorally Efficient Remedies – An Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    breach remedies; imcomplete contracts; cooperative investments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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