Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies
Scholars have been debating for years the comparative advantage of damages and specific performance. Yet, most work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. But contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and parties themselves regularly write contracts which provide such options. In this article, we start filling this gap by studying multi-remedy contracts. Specifically, we compare a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose between liquidated damages and specific performance with an exclusive remedy contract, which restricts the non-breaching party's remedy to liquidated damages only. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 8 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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